Abstract-Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new vulnerability which we call teleportation. An attacker (e.g., a malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g., exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the use cases considered in this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks such as datacenter networks or the Internet have become a critical infrastructure [14] . Not only a large fraction of the economic activity critically depends on the availability of such networks, but also governments increasingly rely on existing and shared infrastructures, mainly for their cost benefits [27] .
This dependency on public and shared infrastructures raises concerns. While the Internet has certainly been a huge success, and over the last years, there has been much innovation on the higher network layers (e.g., application layer) and the lower network layers (e.g., data-link and physical layer), the Internet core suffers from ossification [6] . In particular, it is questionable whether today's network technology is sufficient to ensure essential security, resilience and dependability properties. For instance, today's Internet does not provide any means of path control, and we are still struggling to render routing protocols more secure [30] .
Software-Defined Networking is a novel networking paradigm which promises to enable these necessary innovations, also in terms of security, through its decoupling and consolidation of the control plane, its formally verifiable policies [20] , [21] , [31] , [34] , as well as by introducing new functionality [29] , [33] , [36] , [37] .
However, Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) also introduce new security challenges. In particular, we in this paper study threats introduced by an unreliable south-bound interface, i.e., we consider a threat model in which switches or routers do not behave as expected, but rather are malicious, and e.g., contain hardware backdoors [4] . While many existing network security and monitoring tools rely on the trustworthiness of switches and routers, this assumption has become questionable: attackers have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to compromise switches and routers [1], [5] , [26] , thousands of compromised access and core routers are being traded underground [25] , networking vendors have left backdoors open [2] , [3] , national security agencies can bug network equipment [4] , hacker tools to scan and eventually exploit routers with weak passwords, default settings are openly available on the Web, etc. However, the impact of malicious hardware is not well understood and underexplored today.
In particular, this paper shows an outsourced and consolidated control plane, as it lies at the heart of the SDN paradigm, introduces an opportunity for teleportation: malicious SDN switches may transmit information via the logically centralized software control plane, completely bypassing data plane elements (such as other switches, middleboxes, etc.). By violating logical and even physical separations, teleportation can constitute a serious security threat. For example, teleportation could be used by one malicious switch to discover (and communiate information to) other malicious switches, bypassing security checks in the data plane. As we will show in this paper, teleportation can also be exploited by malicious hosts, triggering (benign) switches to teleport information for them.
We argue that teleportation can be seen as a flexible communication channel which constitutes a threat in various situations, for example (see Figure 1 ): 1) Bypassing critical network components: By implicitly communicating information via the control plane, it is possible to circumvent critical network components, such as switches, middleboxes or policy enforcers located in the data plane. For example, teleportation can in principle be used to bypass middleboxes performing security checks (e.g., network intrusion detection systems), middleboxes in charge of billing (e.g., a Radius server), or QoS enforcers (e.g., a leaky bucket policer). 2) Rendezvous and attack coordination: While already a single malicious switch, for example located inside an enterprise network, may cause significant harm and violate basic security policies, the situation becomes worse if multiple malicious switches cooperate [13] . Malicious or Trojan switches (e.g., switches containing a hardware/software backdoor) may use teleportation as a rendezvous protocol, to discover each other, and subsequently coordinate an attack. 3) Exfiltration: Teleportation can also be used to exfiltrate sensitive information between networks that have no data plane connectivity. 4) Eavesdropping and data tampering: Particularly serious threats are introduced if malicious hosts and switches collude. For instance, in a scenario with collusion, teleportation can be used for eavesdroping. We show that a malicious switch and host can carry out a man-inthe-middle attack that serves benign hosts with malicious web pages. Teleporation can be difficult to detect: the teleported information follows the normal traffic pattern of control communication, not between switches directly but indirectly between any switch and the controller. Moreover, the teleportation channel is inside the (typically encrypted) OpenFlow channel. Accordingly, it cannot easily be detected with modern Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs), even if they operate in the control plane.
A. Our Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions: 1) We identify a new vulnerability which targets the very core of the software-defined networking paradigm, namely the separation of the control and the data plane.
In particular, we consider the threats introduced by a malicious data plane. Indeed, recent incidents related to the trustworthiness of routers and switches, indicate that our threat model is a relevant one. 2) We model and characterize possible teleportation channels theoretically.
3) We recognize and demonstrate four teleportation techniques in software-defined networks utilizing state-ofthe-art OpenFlow controllers, in particular ONOS [38] among others. 4) We present and demonstrate multiple simple and more sophisticated attacks. In particular, we show that teleportation can also be exploited by malicious hosts in scenarios where all switches are benign. 5) We initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures.
In particular, we propose to combine intrusion detection with waypoint-enforcement, forcing Packet-out messages (from controller to switches) to pass through the waypoint if mandated by a security policy. We have already notified the open source community about some of the issues reported in this paper, and first actions have been taken (see CVE-2015-7516 ).
More generally, in the light of today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our work touches a topic whose relevance may increase in the near future and go beyond the use cases considered in this paper.
B. Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the necessary background on OpenFlow and SDN. Section III introduces our threat model, and Section IV characterizes possible teleportation channels. Section V describes teleportation techniques; based on these techniques, we demonstrate and discuss different attacks in Section VI. Section VII initiates the discussion of countermeasures. After reviewing related work in Section VIII, we conclude our work in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This paper considers Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) which outsource and consolidate the control over the network switches to a logically centralized software controller. The separation of the control and data plane has the potential to simplify the network management, as many networking tasks are inherently non-local. Moreover, SDN and especially its de facto standard protocol, OpenFlow, introduce interesting new flexibilities, e.g., in terms of traffic steering: routes may not necessarily be destination based, and can depend on layer-2, layer-3 and even layer-4 properties of the packets.
At the heart of an SDN lies a control software, running on a set of servers. These controllers receive information and statistics from switches, and depending on this information as well as the policies they seek to implement, issue instructions to the switches.
OpenFlow follows a match-action paradigm: The controllers install rules on the switches which consist of a match and an action part; the packets (i.e., flows) matching a rule are subject to the corresponding action. That is, each switch stores a set of (flow) tables which are managed by the controllers, and each table consists of a set of flow entries which specify expressions that need to be matched against the packet headers, as well as actions that are applied to the packet when a given expression is satisfied. Possible actions include dropping the packet, sending it to a given egress port, or modifying its header fields, e.g., adding a tag. The match-action paradigm is attractive as it simplifies formal reasoning and enables policy verification.
By default, if a packet arrives at a switch and does not match an existing rule, the packet (usually without payload if the switch supports packet buffering) is forwarded to the controller. This event is called a Packet-in. Upon a Packetin event, the controller can decide how to react to packets of the corresponding type, and add/delete/modify flow rules accordingly issuing Flow-mod messages to the switch (and maybe to other switches proactively on this occasion as well). A controller can also decide to send out a packet explicitly from a switch, issuing a so-called Packet-out command to the switch.
An attractive alternative to the hop-by-hop installation of new flows, reacting to a new packet repeatedly along the path (multiple Packet-ins), is the so-called "pave-path technique": once the controller receives a first Packet-in event from some switch, it proactively updates the other switches along the path. Such an "intent-based" controller behavior can render the reaction to network event and set up of host-to-host/network connectivity (according to current policies) more efficient.
While SDNs are logically centralized, the control plane can be physically distributed, e.g., for fault-tolerance or performance reasons. Accordingly, OpenFlow supports multiple controllers for a single switch. The controllers and switch exchange Role-request and Role-reply messages respectively to assert the various roles (Master, Equal and Slave). There may be only one Master controller for a given switch while multiple Equal and Slave controllers are permitted.
The OpenFlow standard specifies basic security mechanisms. For example, the communication between the controller and switch can be authenticated and encrypted, using TLS over TCP/UDP.
Finally, we note that although some of our techniques are generally applicable in networks separating the control plane and the data plane, while others exploit OpenFlow specific features, when clear from the context, in this paper we will treat SDN and OpenFlow as synonyms.
III. THREAT MODEL
We in this paper consider a threat model where OpenFlow switches, hosts, or both, may not behave correctly but be malicious.
We do not place any restrictions on what a malicious switch can and cannot do. For example, a malicious switch can fabricate and transmit any type of OpenFlow message, it can arbitrarily deviate from the OpenFlow specification, and it can even use multiple identities, all at the risk of being detected. However, the malicious switch cannot choose where it will be placed in the network. In order to collude, the malicious switches have been programmed to recognize some data and/or timing pattern. Similarly, we do not place any restrictions on what a malicious host can and cannot do. For example, a malicous host may masquerade its Media Access Control (MAC) and/or Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, use an incorrect gateway, falsify Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests/responses, and so on. The attacker could also be an insider, i.e., an authorized user who intends to subvert his/her current organization. We also consider the case where malicious hosts and switches collude. We assume that an attacker has sufficient resources and know-how to compromise hosts/switches and therefore do not concern ourselves with how the host/switch is compromised.
The OpenFlow controller and its applications on the other hand are trusted entities and are available to the switches: for example, they are based on static and dynamic program analyses. The OpenFlow channel is reliable and may be encrypted.
IV. MODELING TELEPORTATION
With these concepts in mind, we now model and characterize a novel threat called teleportation which targets the heart of SDNs: the outsourcing and consolidation of control over multiple data plane elements. In particular, we argue that we can see an OpenFlow controller as a "reactor": it reacts (in a best-effort and timely manner) to events generated by the network operator, the OpenFlow switches, and timeouts; as a response, the controller sends OpenFlow commands to switches. Accordingly, we argue that the following 3-stage functionality is fundamental in the SDN paradigm.
1) Switch to controller: A source switch intentionally or unintentionally sends modulated information to the controller (e.g., by adding specific events, delaying existing events, etc.). 2) Controller to switches: The controller reacts to the received events, by sending commands to one or multiple other switches. 3) Destination processing: A destination switch processes incoming commands from the controller. In case of a malicious switch, the switch may search for some message properties, temporal patterns, etc., and hence infer the information modulated by the source, or by simply forward the information (to a potentially malicious host). Based on this controller model, we can identify two kinds of teleportation channels:
• Explicit teleportation: The teleported information actually appears in the messages exchanged. The message may for example contain steganographic contents.
• Implicit teleportation: The teleportation relies on modulating information implicitly. For example, it is based on timing (e.g., message transmissions are delayed according to some pattern) or it is based on shared resources, whose availability is changed over time (e.g., leveraging mutual exclusion).
V. TELEPORTATION TECHNIQUES
Having established a conceptual model of teleportation, we next present techniques that can realize teleportation in today's SDNs. In particular, we have identified the following three fundamental SDN functionalities which can be exploited for teleportation:
1) Flow (re-)configurations: In an SDN, a controller needs to react to various data plane events (such as so-called Packet-ins in OpenFlow or link failures), and configure and reconfigure flows and paths accordingly. Triggering and exploiting such events can be used for teleportation. 2) Switch identification: In an SDN, switches are responsible for introducing and uniquely identifying themselves to the controller. This is required as policies are often specific to the switch. Unique switch identifiers are also necessary to correctly construct and enforce policies on the switches and in the controller. We will show that such switch identification mechanisms can be exploited for teleportation. 3) Out-of-band forwarding: An SDN controller must not only be able to receive events and control packets from switches, but also to instruct switches to forward specific messages. This basic functionality in SDNs can be exploited by a malicious switch or host to forward entire packets via the controller. In the remainder of this section, we will discuss these teleportation techniques in more detail in turn.
A. Flow (Re-)Configurations
We distinguish between two types of flow re-configuration functions: path update and path reset. a) Path Update: The first technique based on flow reconfiguration we consider is path update. Path updates are a fundamental controller functionality, and come in the form of different controller features such as Mobility, VM Migration or simply MAC Learning. The basic scheme is as follows: A controller typically maintains some mapping of which hosts (MAC addresses) are connected to which ports (on the switch). If a host suddenly appears on another switch, the controller installs new flows for the host on the new switch, and also deletes the corresponding flow rules on the old switch. We define this type of installation and deletion of flows by the controller on switches as path update. Specifically, a path update involves the use of Packet-in, Flow-mod and Packet-out messages. Malicious switches can use path update for implicit teleportation.
For the teleportation with path update, a switch triggers the deletion of rules at other switches. Malicious switches can teleport information between themselves by prompting path updates for the same host using Packet-ins. Note that during a path update, the Packet-out is sent to the destination reported in the Packet-in which may generate data plane traffic. To prevent data plane traffic, the malicious switch can use a destination host that is connected to itself (so that the Packet-out is sent back to it). The message sequence pattern for path update teleportation is shown in Figure 2 .
We can summarize the scheme presented so far with the following abstract steps: a switch s1 announces X, a switch s2 announces X thereby stealing X from s1, where stealing is
X is on s1
Packet-out
X is now on s2!
Packet-out
Flow-add (X->k2)
Flow-delete (X->k1) on received Flow-delete for Xi,j for some
Algorithm 1: Generalized pseudo-code executed by switch s i to teleport information using path update.
detected by the "victim" (s1). Also note that announcing is possible once some host which is connected to the malicious switch (e.g., k1 at s1) is learned by the controller. Based on these basic steps, we can generalize our scheme for m malicious switches. Each malicious switch, s i , with id i ∈ [m], should implement an event handler (see Algorithm 1), in addition to the normal (non-malicious) behavior. We assume that all switches are programmed with the same list of m 2 special MAC addresses {X i,j } i,j∈ [m] (the pre-shared secrets). Note that once switch i discovered switch j, it can contact it by sending packets with source X i,j and destination address X j,i . b) Path Reset: We next discuss a second flow reconfiguration based teleportation which we refer to as path reset. Recall that at the heart of any SDN controller lies the functionality to set up host-to-host/network connectivity, according to the network policy (e.g., defining constraints such as bandwidth, link type and waypoints), which is translated into device level configurations (e.g., flow rules). The "pave-path technique" is an attractive alternative to the hop-by-hop installation of new flows: once the controller receives a first Packet-in event from some switch, it proactively updates the other switches along the path.
In order to provide high availability, a controller also monitors the network state and makes necessary changes, such as rerouting or resetting flows on switches, when needed (e.g., due to a link failure). For example, triggered by a Packet-in event, a controller may learn that (parts of) the path may no longer be available, and hence initiates the
Flow-add (k2->k1) Fig. 3 : Message sequence pattern for path reset teleportation. Switch s1 teleports information to s2 and s3 via Flow-add messages sent by the controller c0.
reconfiguration/repair of the path. We define the reinstallation of flows by the controller on switches along a path as path reset. Accordingly, the path reset technique involves Packet-in, Flow-mod and Packet-out messages. Malicious switches may use path reset for implicit teleportation: If the controller resets the complete path between hosts when it receives a Packet-in from a switch that ignores the flow rule, then information can be communicated. By doing this at multiple and specific times, a malicious switch can teleport information to other malicious switches along the path. Figure 3 illustrates the message sequence pattern for teleportation using path reset.
B. Switch Identification
This teleportation type exploits the fact that a switch typically must uniquely identify itself whenever it connects to the controller. For example, in OpenFlow this is usually done using the Datapath-ID (DPID) field in the Features-reply message. We define two switches attempting to use the same DPID to connect to the same logical controller as switch identification. The outcome can be used for implicit teleportation.
Three basic ways an OpenFlow controller can react to using the same DPID are as follows:
1) The controller denies the second switch a connection.
2) The controller terminates the first switch and connects to the second. 3) The controller accepts both switches but sends them different Role-request messages. With any of the above outcomes a switch can infer the (mis)use of the same DPID by another switch. By using apriori configured single or multiple DPID values, a pair of malicious switches can establish teleportation. For example, consider the message sequence pattern in Figure 4 , and assume that first switch s1 tells controller c0 that its DPID is 1. At a later time, switch s2 tells c0 that its DPID is 1. At this point, c0 does not allow s2 to connect with DPID 1. Since c0 denied s2 to connect with DPID 1, s1 teleported information to s2 via c0. With a similar message sequence pattern, the second outcome can be used for teleportation as well. Terminate connection with s2 Fig. 4 : Message sequence pattern for switch identification teleportation when the controller denies the second switch a connection. When s2's connection is terminated, s1 successfully teleports information to s2.
Features-reply(DPID=1) s1 has DPID=1 c1 is Master for s1
Role-request=Master c1 is Master for s1
Role-reply=Master
Features-reply(DPID=1) s2 has DPID=1
Role decision messages c2 is Equal for s2
Role-request=Equal c2 is Equal for s2
Role-reply=Equal Fig. 5 : Message sequence pattern for switch identification teleportation when controllers c1 and c2 send different Rolerequest messages to s1 and s2 respectively. When s1 receives the Role-request=Master message whereas s2 receives the Rolerequest=Equal message. In this manner s1 teleports information to s2 when s2 received the Role-request=Equal message.
Interestingly, switch identification is not limited to scenarios with a single controller: we have found additional threats in the presence of distributed control planes. Moreover, we can generalize the first switch identification outcome to scenarios with m malicious switches, see the event-handler algorithm, Algorithm 2. The other two outcomes discussed can also be seen as event-handler algorithms.
C. Out-of-band Forwarding
The third and potentially most powerful teleportation technique is called out-of-band forwarding. It is an example of explicit teleportation. Out-of-band forwarding exploits the fact that an SDN controller is typically connected to multiple switches: accordingly, a packet from one switch can potentially reach multiple other switches in the network via the control plane. Out-of-band forwarding involves Packet-in and Packetout messages with the possible side effect of Flow-mod messages. Out-of-band forwarding could for example include the complete Ethernet frame (typically 1500 bytes), and can even serve as a "multicast service". Out-of-band forwarding can be a serious threat to network security, not only because malicious traffic can bypass critical security functions in the data plane, but also because it can be exploited both by switches and hosts. A summary of our teleportation techniques is shown in Table I along with the type of teleportation and the associated OpenFlow messages.
VI. SWITCH-AND HOST-BASED ATTACKS
Let us now demonstrate how the identified teleportation techniques could be exploited to carry out specific attacks. In particular, we show how teleportation may be exploited: 1) to bypass security critical network functions such as firewalls and Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS); 2) as a rendezvous protocol for malicious switches; 3) to exfiltrate sensitive data from remote locations; 4) to conduct a man-in-the-middle (mitm) attack. Along the way, we also present a novel denial-of-service (dos) attack (published as CVE-2015-7516).
Before presenting the attacks in more detail, we report on the setting in which we tested the attacks.
A. Setup
We verified all our attacks in a virtual machine, using Mininet-2.2.0, Open vSwitch-2.0.1 for the data plane. For the control plane we used ONOS-1.3.1 as it was the stateof-the-art. At the time of our experimentation Floodlight, OpenDaylight Lithium-SR2 and RYU v3.27 still did not support the intent based framework. Indeed our experiments showed that they were only vulnerable to a subset of the attacks (e.g., switch identification, out-of-band-forwarding 1 ) For packet generation we use ping and nmap-6.40. We use ebtables v2.0.10-4 (December 2011) as our transparent firewall and Snort version 2.9.6.0 GRE (Build 47) as our NIDS. We modified code developed by austinmarton [8] to set the Ethertype field in an Ethernet frame. ettercap 0.8.0 is used with a custom HTTP filter for the mitm attack.
B. Bypassing Critical Network Functions
We believe that the possibility to bypass network elements is a serious threat in modern computer networks. For example, many network policies today are defined in terms of adjacency matrices or big switch abstractions, specifying which traffic is allowed between an ingress port s and an egress network port t [19] . In order to enforce such a policy, traffic from s to t needs to traverse a middlebox instance (waypoint) inspecting and classifying the flows. The location of every middlebox may be optimized, but is subject to the constraint that the route from s to t should always go via the waypoint.
Firewall and NIDS: In order to demonstrate how a firewall may be circumvented by hosts (or switches), we set up Mininet and ONOS as shown in Figure 6 . The switches do not have flow rules for k1 and k2 to communicate. The firewall f w1 prevents hosts on the left to communicate with hosts on the right and vice-versa. ONOS has the Intent Reactive Forwarding (ifwd) application enabled. ifwd uses the reactive "pave-path technique" (discussed above) to install flows in the switches. By default, the ifwd application establishes host-to-host connectivity when it receives a Packet-in for which no flows exist.
We send a ping packet from k1 to k2. Despite the presence of the firewall, k1 receives the reply from k2 using out-ofband forwarding teleportation. In the absence of out-of-band forwarding teleportation, the packet would have been dropped by f w1.
Indeed, in this case out-of-band forwarding teleportation has the side effect of installing flows on s1 and s2 for k1 and k2 to communicate, preventing further out-of-band forwarding teleportation. By masquerading its MAC address, k1 can teleport more data to k2 via out-of-band forwarding teleportation.
Similar to the firewall scenario, we can also use out-of-band forwarding teleportation in the presence of Snort, an NIDS. In particular, we can generate attack traffic using nmap to conduct TCP flag attacks or even port scans. Indeed, by masquerading the source MAC address, one can effectively carry out a wide enough port scan without having the scan pass through the firewall and being detected by the latter.
By replacing the firewall we previously described with Snort, we use nmap from k1 to carry out a TCP port scan on k3 using out-of-band forwarding teleportation. By inspecting the and an OpenFlow controller c0. k1 and k3 are connected to s1 while k2 and k4 are connected to s2. s1 and s2 are separated by a firewall f w1 that denies hosts on s1 to communicate with hosts on s2 and vice-versa. k1 can use out-of-band forwarding teleportation to transfer data to k2, bypassing f w1.
alerts in Snort we verified that no alerts were generated for the port scan. Note that the host-to-host connectivity setup involves a Packet-in and Flow-mod messages whereas the out-of-band forwarding teleportation only involves Packet-in and Packet-out messages with the side effect of Flow-mod messages. Therefore, security policy enforcers that do not inspect and correlate Packet-in with Packet-outs, will miss out-of-band forwarding teleportation based attacks. Of course, violating Flow-mods may eventually be detected, but only after the data has been teleported.
C. Rendezvous and Malicious Switch Discovery Protocol
We next consider a rendezvous protocol in which malicious switches wish to discover one another. A rendezvous or discovery protocol can be also seen as a precursor to a much more damaging attack such as a denial-of-service, man-in-themiddle (mitm) or exfiltration.
Teleportation can be an attractive solution: a rendezvous protocol can rely on steganography i.e., embedding patterns in teleported benign information or modulating patterns in legitimate messages. Without teleportation, by going through the data plane directly, the malicious switches risk detection.
We show how three of our techniques, namely path update, path reset and switch identification teleportation may be used as a rendezvous protocol for malicious switches.
1) Path Update: To demonstrate a rendezvous with path update teleportation, we set up Mininet and ONOS as shown in Figure 7 . Instead of instrumenting code for the malicious switches, we keep them as simple Open vSwitches and we defined dedicated Mininet hosts (k3 and k4) for each of them. We use the dedicated hosts (k3 and k4) to generate the packet that the malicious switch sends as a Packet-in to the controller. The host mobility and ifwd applications are enabled on ONOS. The controller has already installed flows for k1 to k2 and vice-versa. Accordingly, we use k4 connected to s2, to send k2 and s4, OpenFlow controller c0. Hosts k1 and k3 are connected to s1 and k2 and k4 are connected to s2. c0 has installed flows on s1, s3 and s2 so that k1 and k2 can communicate bi-directionally. Teleportation traffic is via c0. a packet using k1 as the source MAC address. This triggers the controller to issue Flow-mod commands to s1, s2 and s3. s2 thereby teleported its presence to s1.
By inspecting the flows on the switches, we verified the successful path update teleportation: s2 was able to cause a flow deletion in s1 without exchanging any packets with s1 directly (except for a normal flow in the past).
Note that path update may trigger alerts in systems that keep track of moving MAC addresses by inspecting Packet-in and Flow-mod messages. In such cases, many moving MAC addresses may introduce suspicious activity within the network. Also worth noting is that port-based security (that associates MAC addresses with specific ports) is not applicable in the presence of malicious switches.
2) Path Reset: To demonstrate that path reset teleportation can be used as a rendezvous protocol, we consider the same setup as outlined in Section VI-C1. We modulate traffic between k1 and k2 using ping packets with 100 microseconds intervals. Instead of manipulating the Open vSwitch code for sending a Packet-in for an existing flow from s1, we simply remove the flow for k1 to k2 on s1, using the ovs-ofctl del-flow command. This causes s1 to send c0 a Flowremoved message which triggers the controller to add the flow back onto s1. But due to the high rate of ping traffic, at least one packet triggers a table-miss before s1 adds the flow and a Packet-in is sent to c0.
When c0 receives the Packet-in it sends the packet to s2 directly as a Packet-out, bypassing s3, and then sends Flowmods to s1, s2 and s3 resetting the bi-directional path between k1 and k2. By checking the lifetime of the flow rules on s1, s2 and s3 we verified that path reset teleportation succeeded. In this manner, s1 teleported its presence to s2 by having the controller send Flow-mod commands for existing flow rules.
Note that such an attack works in the presence of topology spoofing defenses [11] , [15] as the Packet-in and Flow-mod Controller network Fig. 8 : An SDN topology with independent OpenFlow switches controlled by independent OpenFlow controllers. c1 and c2 share and synchronize state information via an independent controller network. s1 is controlled by c1 and s2 is controlled by c2 respectively. messages generated do not alter the existing topology. Indeed, receiving a Packet-in for a flow that exists in the switch is suspicious but we are not aware of any work that keeps track of such events.
3) Switch Identification: We now demonstrate how two malicious switches may teleport their presence using switch identification. We set up Mininet and ONOS as shown in Figure 7 with only s1, s3 and s4 having connected to c0 with DPID 1, 3 and 4 respectively. Also, there are no flows installed on the switches for hosts to communicate. We modified the Mininet script to configure s2 with the same DPID as s1.
When s2 tries to connect to c0 with DPID 1 after s1 has connected to c0, it is denied a connection. This way, s1 teleports its presence to s2.
In Floodlight and OpenDaylight, when s2 attempts to connect to c0 with DPID 1 after s1 has connected, Floodlight terminates the connection with s1 and accepts s2's connection. s2 thereby teleports its presence to s1. Interestingly RYU allowed switches with the same DPID to co-exist which potentially introduces additional issues. Switch identification teleportation is also possible when multiple controllers manage independent switches. We set up Mininet and ONOS as shown in Figure 8 . Initially s1 connects to c1 with DPID 1. c1 then declares itself as the Master for s1. At a later time, s2 connects to c2 and claims to have DPID 1. c2 then sends s2 the Equal role. In this manner, s1 teleports its presence to s2. By inspecting the OpenFlow channels, we verified the different Role-request messages sent by the respective controllers to their respective switches.
D. Exfiltration
Our next attack is related to data exfiltration. This is a key concern for many organizations that own intellectual property, personal data or any kind of sensitive information. Once an attacker gets into a network, one possible goal of the attacker is to stealthily exfiltrate sensitive data.
We demonstrate exfiltration by considering a scenario where a small number of hosts are networked together in a remote Fig. 9 : An SDN topology with OpenFlow switches s1, s2, s3 and s4 and an OpenFlow controller c0. k1 and k3 are connected to s1 while k2 and k4 are connected to s2. Note that s2 is not connected to the other switches, and thereby is isolated in the data plane. k2 can still exfiltrate data to k1 using out-ofband forwarding teleportation circumventing the data plane isolation.
location. The data plane isolation is meant to improve security. However the data plane elements are managed by a controller that handles other similar remote locations. We show that in such a network, not only malicious switches can exfiltrate data using out-of-band forwarding teleportation but even malicious hosts.
We set up Mininet and ONOS as shown in Figure 9 . ONOS has the ifwd application activated By showing how k2 can exfiltrate data to k1, we also demonstrate how s2 can also exfiltrate data to k1 or s1.
Given that s1 and s2 do not have flow rules for traffic from k2 to k1 (as they are located in disconnected data planes), k2 can exfiltrate data to k1 by simply sending a packet (e.g., UDP packet) to k1 thereby exploiting out-of-band forwarding teleportation. The controller will receive the packet from s2 and send it to s1 which will then forward the packet to k1.
By inspecting the OpenFlow channels, we can see the outof-band forwarding teleportation, first as a Packet-in and then as a Packet-out.
E. Evading Policy Conflicts
For an attacker, remaining stealthy is key to persistent existence. One of the side effects of using the out-of-band forwarding teleportation is the Flow-mod messages issued by the controller. The Flow-mod messages may generate policy conflicts (unauthorized/conflicting flow rules), alerting the adminstrator. A stealthier version of using the out-of-band forwarding teleportation would be to prevent the Flow-mod side effect. This would not only prevent policy conflicts, but also leave minimal traces on the source and sink switches.
In order to demonstrate this attack, we set up Mininet and ONOS with ifwd activated as shown in Figure 9 . k2 can exfiltrate data to k1 using out-of-band forwarding teleportation without triggering Flow-mod's on s2 and s1 by masquerading
Packet-out (K2->K1) Fig. 10 : The message sequence pattern for evading policy conflicts using out-of-band forwarding teleportation. The side effect of Flow-mod messages are avoided when Jumbo frames are used from a masqueraded MAC address; only Packet-ins and Packet-outs are used.
its source MAC address and ETHER TYPE (e.g., Jumbo frame: 0x8870). If the packet processor and intent framework cannot correctly identify a packet, their behavior may violate security policies. Note that it is enough if the ETHER TYPE is set to a value that ONOS does not recognize, and we are not restricted to Jumbo frames only. The message sequence pattern for outof-band forwarding teleportation without the Flow-mod side effect is shown in Figure 10 .
By inspecting the OpenFlow channels, we can verify that the packet was indeed teleported via out-of-band forwarding teleportation first as a Packet-in and then as a Packet-out. By inspecting the flows on the switches, we can verify that no new flows are present.
Remark on a Denial-of-service Attack: Interestingly, we observed that a side effect of our out-of-band forwarding teleportation is a novel denial-of-service attack. If in our evading policy conflicts example, the host sends the same packet (Jumbo frame) again, then ifwd encounters a null-pointer exception and disconnects the switch that sent it the packet. This shows how a malicious host can cause the switch it is connected to, to be disconnected from the controller even when a packet it sends is not corrupted.
We emphasize that this is a side effect of out-of-band forwarding teleportation only, and not a teleportation issue in itself. Fortunately, the issue has been resolved by the opensource community after we contacted them (published as CVE-2015-7516).
F. Man-In-The-Middle
While we have so far focused on attacks where either only switches or only hosts are malicious, we now detail an attack that involves a malicious switch and a malicious host. The damage of such a collaboration can be severe, for example, the attackers could serve benign hosts with malicious web pages. In order to exemplify the attack we use HTTP rather than HTTPS.
For this attack, we set up Mininet and ONOS with ifwd activated as shown in Figure 11 . s1 and k2 are both malicious while the others are not. k3 is a benign web server. s1 teleports specific HTTP traffic towards k2. k2 modifies the HTTP traffic and teleports it back to s1 who then forwards it to k1. In order to emulate the malicious switch, we introduced a flow rule with c0 the OpenFlow controller. k1 and k3 are connected to s1 while k2 is connected to s2. f w1 denies k2 to communicate with k1 and k3 and vice-versa via the data plane. s1 and k2 being malicious, exploit the out-of-band forwarding teleportation to eavesdrop and modify communication data between k1 and k3 bypassing f w1.
(shown in Listing 1) that rewrites the destination MAC address for TCP traffic with PSH and ACK flags sent from k3 to k1 to k2. This modified packet is then passed through the flow table lookup again by using the resubmit action in Open vSwitch. k2 runs ettercap to modify the TCP/HTTP payload and forwards the packet to the correct destination. Specifically, we created an ettercap filter that looks inside HTTP responses from k3 for the word "good", replaces it with "evil" and sends it to k1. The firewall f w1 is meant to block traffic between hosts on the right and the left.
When k1 requests the index.html page from k3, based on the flow rule installed on s1, only HTTP responses from k2 are teleported to s2 and forwarded to k2, through the out-ofband forwarding teleportation. Subsequently, k2 modifies only the index.html web page and has s2 teleport it back to s1 via out-of-band forwarding teleportation. Indeed, the side effect is Flow-mod messages to s1 and s2.
By viewing the index.html file received at k1 we verified that the mitm attack was successful. The benign and malicious web pages are shown in Listing 2 and Listing 3 respectively. By inspecting the flow counters on the switches we verified that necessary packets did not pass through the data plane.
Note that we did not introduce code into the Open vSwitches to handle the mitm, therefore once the flows are installed on the switches, the firewall will block all traffic between s1 and s2 and vice-versa.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
Having showcased a variety of attacks using teleportation, we now start exploring possible countermeasures. Although we have demonstrated all the attacks using ONOS we believe that these issues are likely to become more general in nature. They are becoming important with the shift towards automated r o o t @ M i n i n e t −vm :˜# c u r l h t t p : / / 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 <html> <head> < t i t l e >Welcome page </ t i t l e > <body> good </body> </ html> Listing 2: HTML code from the benign web server. Note the word "good" is present in the body of the HTML code.
and intent aware controller frameworks allowing for simpler and agnostic controller applications. Based on our experiments we have also seen that the resources required and utilized for teleportation, even at high rates are low. Therefore, it may be difficult to distinguish the attack traffic from the benign traffic. Accordingly we believe that, with the separation of the control and data plane, it is now important to monitor and police the communication channel between the separated planes.
A. Packet-in-Packet-out Watcher
In order to prevent the out-of-band forwarding teleportation, we strongly advise the use of a Packet-in and Packet-out watcher. It can either exist as a controller application or as an application that resides between the controller and switches akin to hypervisors. It would involve tracking and enforcing security policies for Packet-ins and their corresponding Packetouts. Existing security enforcement kernels, hypervisors and security applications must account for Packet-ins and Packetouts in addition to Flow-mods to detect and prevent out-of-band forwarding teleportation.
Note that the out-of-band forwarding teleportation in essence could also be used by malicious controller applications. In a non-adversarial scenario, the order in which a packet's fate is decided upon by various applications can inadvertently teleport the packet. Therefore, verifying that the Packet-out does not reach an undesired switch/host can prevent out-of-band forwarding teleportation.
B. Audit-Trails and Accountability
We propose controllers to introduce secure audit-trail capabilities and accounting that enable network administrators to thoroughly investigate events in their networks. For example, controllers must log and alert sensitive events such a moving r o o t @ M i n i n e t −vm :˜# c u r l h t t p : / / 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 <html> <head> < t i t l e >Welcome page </ t i t l e > <body> e v i l </body> </ html> Listing 3: HTML code modified by the malicious switch s1 and host k2. Note the word "evil" is present in the body of the HTML code.
MAC addresses or receiving a Packet-in when a flow has not yet timed out. Such capabilities can aid detection and prevention mechanisms. It is also useful for investigating security incidents. We recommend administrators to frequently view controller logs, investigate failed events and suspicious identities in the network.
C. Enhanced IDS with Waypoint Enforcement
Network intrusion detection systems are an important means to detect and limit cyber attacks today, and accordingly intrusion detection systems constitute an integral part of most networks. We strongly suggest the use of an IDS application on top of the controller, that can inspect Packet-ins and Packet-outs and alert on suspicous traffic. Indeed, some controllers today already offer basic functionality for waypoint enforcement. In particular, we suggest waypoint enforcement and coordinating intrusion detection systems from the control plane with the data plane. This is non-trivial, but vital for network security.
VIII. RELATED WORK
While researchers have already pointed out several interesting novel challenges in providing a correct operation of networks with separate data and control planes [31] , [34] , [39] , it is generally believed that SDN has the potential to render computer networking more verifiable [20] , [21] and even secure [18] , [28] , [29] , [33] , [36] , [37] .
Only recently researchers have started discovering security threats in SDN. Kloti et al. [22] report on a STRIDE threat analysis of OpenFlow, and demonstrate data plane resource consumption attacks. Kreutz et al. [23] survey several threat vectors that may enable the exploitation of SDN vulnerabilities. A key challenge arising from the separation of the control and data planes is the potential loss of network visibility. It has been shown that the network view of the controller may even be poisoned [11] , [15] .
While much research went into designing more robust and secure control planes [9] , [10] , less published work exists on the issue of malicious switches. A notable exception is the work by Antikainen et al. [7] , who consider the possibility of a malicious relay node for a man-in-the-middle attack. Interestingly, in our paper, we have shown that the relay node can be the benign controller itself.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to point out and characterize the fundamental problem of SDN teleportation. More generally, while most prior studies about malicious switches focus on (indirect) attacks targeting the controller, we in this paper demonstrate new kinds of attacks which merely exploit the controller for directly attacking (e.g., the availability or confidentiality) of network services.
However, there are a number of interesting approaches proposed in the literature which have implications for our scenarios as well. For example, the pre-and post-conditions of Topoguard [15] can defend against our path update attack. However, if the switches are malicious, these conditions can be spoofed by the malicious switches. Also, Topoguard cannot detect teleportation using path reset, switch identification and out-of-band forwarding teleportation.
Sphinx [11] can alert on the path update teleportation. However, it cannot detect the path reset as the flow graph remains the same. Additionally, Sphinx assumes that switches cannot use the same DPIDs therefore, we believe that our switch identification teleportation will not be detected by Sphinx. Also, our out-of-band forwarding relies on Packet-in and Packet-out messages, while Packet-outs are not considered by Sphinx 2 . Therefore the suggested out-of-band forwarding teleportation can evade Sphinx, until topology altering flows are installed.
Porras et al. [32] propose a security mediator that comprises of Rule Conflict Analysis, Role-based Source Authentication, State Table Manager and a Permission Mediator. We admit that the path update can be detected using this approach, however, our path reset does not introduce any conflicting rules. The Features-reply messages are not a part of their solution therefore, we believe that switch identification teleportation can succeed. With respect to out-of-band forwarding teleportation, unless the mediator investigates the destination switch or MAC address in the Packet-out, the teleportation can bypass the security mediator given sufficient permissions.
SDN Hypervisors such as CoVisor [16] , Flowvisor [35] , FortNOX [33] depend on policies maintained in the hypervisor. Therefore, we believe that all our teleportation mechanisms hold unless a specific policy blocks it. Dover Networks [12] discovered the behavior of Floodlight with switches using the same DPID, which we exploit for teleportation.
While Security-Mode ONOS [17] can enhance the security in many scenarios, by introducing roles and permissions, at least today, it does not help against teleportation: once ifwd has the permission to write intents and emit packets, our teleportation succeeds. These permissions are bare necessities for ifwd to function.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
As OpenFlow networks transition from research to production, new levels of reliability and performance are necessary [24] . This paper has identified and demonstrated a novel security threat introduced by software-defined networks separating the control plane from the data plane, in the presence of an unreliable south-bound interface (containing malicious 2 Unfortunately, the source code of Sphinx is not available. Table II) : it can be exploited to bypass security-critical network elements (e.g., to exfiltrate confidential information), as a discovery protocol for malicious switches, to evade policy conflicts as well as for man-in-themiddle attacks. Based on our preliminary evaluation, we can say that even a teleportation channel of over 10 Mbps can easily be used inside a loaded control channel. Our work can also be seen as a first security analysis of the increasingly popular intent-based network mechanisms: while intent-based mechanisms are attractive for allowing (cloud) network operators resp. SDN applications to focus on "what to connect" rather than "how', we have shown that controller managed intents need to be used with care. Indeed, our experiments with controllers that are only starting to introduce an intent based mechanism are not yet vulnerable to all the specific attacks presented in this paper. Moreover, while intent mechanism implementations can vary across controllers, we believe that the underlying issues are fundamental.
We understand our work as a first step, and believe that our paper opens several relevant directions for future research. In particular, we plan to extend our vulnerability analysis to other SDN protocols and conduct a more in-depth performance analysis. Another relevant avenue for future research regards the development of countermeasures.
